

Research Question

- ▶ Does competition increase or decrease social welfare?
- ► Theory is ambiguous
 - ▶ Low price sensitivity leads to Medical Arms Race (MAR) -> decrease welfare
 - Payers can negotiate lower prices when competition is high -> increase welfare

Previous Empirical Limitations

- ▶ 1. Looked at wrong dependent variables (e.g. list price vs. discounted price)
- ▶ 2. Construction of "market competitiveness measure" is inherently biased
 - ▶ The "variable radius method" (radius that covers 75% patients served by a hospital)
 - ► HHI = Sum of squared "share of patient flows"
 - Spending = HHI (patient flow depends on quality) + unobserved hospital quality (OV bias)
- > 3. Not enough control variables (e.g. hospital characteristics)

Models (Step 1)

- Predict probabilities of admission for every patient
 - ► Typical discrete choice estimation
 - Z: hospital characteristics (such as teaching vs. non-teaching)
 - ▶ D⁺: Distance between current hospital vs. closest good substitute
 - ▶ D⁻: Distance between current hospital vs. closest poor substitute

$$Y_{ij}^* = V(D_{ij}^{1+}, \dots, D_{ij}^{H+}, D_{ij}^{1-}, \dots, D_{ij}^{H-}; Z_j^1, \dots, Z_j^H)$$

 $+ W(X_i; Z_j^1, \dots, Z_j^H) + \epsilon_{ij}.$


▶ Then, predict the number of patients admitted to each hospital


Models (Step 2)

- ▶ Construct measure of "market concentration"
 - $\blacktriangleright HHI_k^{pat} = \sum_{j=1}^J \widehat{\alpha_{jk}}^2$
 - $ightharpoonup \widehat{\alpha_{jk}}$ = share of patients from zip k going to hospital j
 - $\blacktriangleright HHI_{j}^{hosp} = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \widehat{\beta_{kj}} * HHI_{k}^{pat}.$
 - $\triangleright \widehat{\beta_{kj}}$ = share of people going to j who are from k
 - $\blacktriangleright HHI_k^{pat*} = \sum_{j=1}^{J} \widehat{\alpha_{jk}} * HHI_j^{hosp}$

Models (Step 2 - continued)

- Why go through this ordeal?
 - ▶ Two levels of market concentration: patient level and hospital level
 - \blacktriangleright We can't use HHI_k^{pat} directly because it doesn't account for hospital level concentration
 - \blacktriangleright We can't use HHI_i^{hosp} due to omitted variable bias (previously discussed)
- ▶ Patient-level concentration vs. Hospital-level concentration





Models (Step 3)

Regress health expenditures on market concentration

$$\begin{aligned} \ln{(R_{ikt})} &= \delta_k + \sigma_t M_k + U_{ikt} \phi \\ &+ HHI_{kt}^{\text{pat}^*} * I(1985 \vee 1988) \eta_{1980s} \\ &+ HHI_{kt}^{\text{pat}^*} * I(1991 \vee 1994) \eta_{1990s} \\ &+ OMC_{kt} * I(1985 \vee 1988) \psi_{1980s} \\ &+ OMC_{kt} * I(1991 \vee 1994) \psi_{1990s} + \xi_{ikt}, \end{aligned}$$

Data / Setting

- ► Longitudinal Medicare claims data
 - ► AMI patients only
- ▶ U. S. hospital characteristics collected by the American Hospital Association
- ▶ Patient HMO enrollment data from InterStudy Publications

Results

- **Before 1991**
 - ▶ Less competition -> less cost + higher rates of mortality
 - Overall impact on social welfare is unclear
- ▶ After 1991
 - ▶ Less competition -> higher cost + higher rates of mortality
 - ▶ Cost if 8.4% higher if market concentration move from first to third quartile
 - Overall impact is clear (higher competition -> better welfare)
- ► Higher Managed Care Enrollments -> lower cost + no negative impact on health

Conclusion

- Using traditional HHI in analysis can generate biased results
- ▶ Note the time varying effect of competition on welfare
- Discussions:
 - ▶ 1. Why do you think people still use HHI?
 - 2. Do you think not-for-profit hospitals care about competition?

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On the misuse of regressions of price on the HHI in merger review

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